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Interactions in social life may be seriously affected by negative noise, whereby actual or perceived
behavior is less cooperative than was intended (e.g., arriving late due to an unforeseen traffic jam). The
present research examines whether negative noise exerts detrimental effects on impressions and coop-
eration and whether such effects could be reduced by communication. Consistent with hypotheses, Study
1 revealed that negative noise exerts detrimental effects on both impressions of partners’ benign intent
and cooperation and that these detrimental effects could be effectively reduced by communication about
noise. Study 2 replicated both findings but only for individuals with low trust. Mediation analysis
revealed that impressions of benign intent and prosocial interaction goals underlie the positive effects of
communication on cooperation.
It is an inevitable fact from social life that one’s behavior is not
always perceived or experienced by others as intended, and some-
times one is simply not able to act according to his or her inten-
tions. For example, even if people are strongly determined to
arrive on time for a meeting, their actions may be subject to
unintended errors (e.g., taking the wrong exit, being held up by an
unexpected traffic jam) that cause them to arrive late. In the
context of social dilemmas (i.e., conflicts between self-interest and
collective interest) such unintended errors are referred to as noise,
which is defined as “discrepancies between intended and actual
outcomes for an interaction partner due to unintended errors” (e.g.,
Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Tazelaar, 2002, p. 768; cf. Kollock,
1993; Wu & Axelrod, 1995).
Of particular relevance to the present research is negative noise;
that is, unintended errors that cause actual outcomes to be worse
than intended. Relative to positive noise—that is, unintended er-
rors that cause actual outcomes to be better than intended—
negative noise is assumed to form a stronger challenge to trust and
impressions of benign intent, as well as a stronger threat to
cooperative interaction. For example, failure to respond to an
e-mail message due to a computer network breakdown may cause
misunderstanding, thereby exerting detrimental effects on impres-
sions (“he always makes me wait”) and future cooperation (“next
time, I will make him wait as well”). Indeed, the concept of
negative noise gives rise to several intriguing questions. Do inci-
dents of negative noise always exert detrimental effects on impres-
sions and cooperation? More important: What can people do to
reduce such (assumed) detrimental effects? Is it possible to “undo”
incidents of noise and, if so, how? Is it possible to undo noise by
communication, informing the other when a particular interaction
outcome was affected by noise (“I did not mean it that way”)?
The present research addresses these questions, thereby pursu-
ing two complementary goals. First, we wish to demonstrate that
incidents of negative noise (henceforth, noise) exert detrimental
effects on impressions of interpersonal intent and cooperative
interaction. Second, we wish to present evidence relevant to the
claim that communication about noise serves as an effective in-
terpersonal means for reducing detrimental effects of noise. Such
evidence would, among other extensions, complement extant re-
search on noise—which consists almost exclusively of computer
simulations—by illuminating a truly psychological and interper-
sonal mechanism for reducing detrimental effects of noise in social
dilemmas. In pursuing these two goals, we advance a framework
based on earlier research (Van Lange et al., 2002), which suggests
that incidents of negative noise in social dilemmas challenge trust
and impressions of benign intent. We argue that communication
about noise primarily serves to restore trust and impressions of
benign intent, which are both essential for establishing and main-
taining cooperative interaction.
Does Noise Exert Detrimental Effects?
Although we do not know of any empirical research addressing
this question, it is plausible that noise exerts detrimental effects on
impressions and cooperation. Research using computer simula-
tions reveals that noise tends to exert detrimental effects on coop-
eration, suggesting that even a few incidents of noise disrupt
cooperative interaction (e.g., Bendor, Kramer, & Stout, 1991;
Mirjam J. A. Tazelaar, Paul A. M. Van Lange, and Jaap W. Ouwerkerk,
Department of Social Psychology, Free University, Amsterdam, Amster-
dam, the Netherlands.
Jaap W. Ouwerkerk is now at the Department of Social Psychology,
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
We are grateful to Marcello Gallucci for very helpful comments regard-
ing an earlier version as well as for his excellent advice regarding statistical
analyses. Parts of this research were presented at the Ninth International
Conference on Social Dilemmas, Chicago, June 2001, and the General
Meeting of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology,
San Sebastian, Spain, June 2002.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Paul
A. M. Van Lange, Department of Social Psychology, Free University,
Amsterdam, Van der Boechorststraat 1, 1081 BT Amsterdam, the Nether-
lands. E-mail: pam.van.lange@psy.vu.nl
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2004 by the American Psychological Association
2004, Vol. 87, No. 6, 845–859 0022-3514/04/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.87.6.845
845
Molander, 1985). Such detrimental effects are especially pro-
nounced for strategies that are largely reciprocal in nature—which
tend to be strategies that are also commonly observed in actual
participants (e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Van Lange, 1999; see
also Komorita & Parks, 1995). Moreover, some anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that noise may exert detrimental effects on both
impressions and cooperation. The example of failure to respond to
an e-mail message because of a computer network breakdown may
serve as a useful illustration of the idea that unintended events may
cause detrimental effects on impressions and on future coopera-
tion. A more powerful illustration is the example of the South
Korean airliner that mistakenly flew over the Soviet Union during
the Cold War (see Wu & Axelrod, 1995). The plane was subse-
quently shot down by the Soviets, killing all 269 people on board,
thereby causing a short but sharp escalation of Cold War tensions,
as described by Goldstein (1991, p. 202).
The present research seeks to extend simulation studies and
anecdotal evidence by providing a more stringent, experimental
test of the detrimental effects of noise on both impressions of
benign intent and cooperation. Moreover, we explore whether
impressions of benign intent may mediate the detrimental effects
on cooperation.
Coping With Noise: Past Research
What should one do to effectively reduce the (potential) detri-
mental effects of noise? To begin with, computer simulations
suggest that reciprocity is not an effective means for reducing the
detrimental effects of noise (e.g., Bendor et al., 1991; Nowak &
Sigmund, 1992). Indeed, if a person were to behave in a com-
pletely reciprocal manner, as advocated by the tit-for-tat (TFT)
strategy, partners would become trapped in cycles of noncooper-
ative interaction, which is referred to as the echo effect or negative
reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984; Van Lange, 1999). Because TFT does
not initiate cooperation, it does not actively contribute to breaking
out of the pattern of negative reciprocity; if anything, TFT supports
negative reciprocity.
A more promising means of coping with noise is adding gen-
erosity to TFT. Issues relevant to generosity are not new. Indeed,
generosity has been addressed in classic research by examining
issues such as conditional and unconditional forms of cooperation
(e.g., Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975), the benefits of increasing
cooperative behavior over time (e.g., Harford & Solomon, 1967),
and the verbal expression of conditional forms of cooperation
along with some initiation of cooperative behavior after mutual
noncooperation (e.g., Lindskold, 1978; Osgood, 1962; for an over-
view, see Komorita & Parks, 1995; Pruitt, 1998). However, these
studies did not examine whether generosity may help reduce or
overcome the detrimental effects of noise.
More recently, computer simulations (Bendor et al., 1991; Kol-
lock, 1993) have suggested that, relative to strictly reciprocal
strategies, strategies that respond a bit more cooperatively than the
partner did in the previous trial appear to suffer less from incidents
of noise. Recently, we extended computer simulations by compar-
ing the responses of real participants, under conditions of noise and
no noise, to TFT and a generous version of TFT (TFT  1; a
strategy that behaves always a bit more cooperatively than the
interaction partner did in the previous trial; Van Lange et al.,
2002). As have most simulation studies, results revealed that TFT
suffered from noise, whereas TFT  1 did not. In fact, under
conditions of noise, TFT  1 even elicited significantly higher
levels of cooperation than did TFT. Also, the intentions of a
partner pursuing TFT were judged as being less benign under noise
than under no noise, whereas the intentions of partners pursuing
TFT  1 were evaluated as quite benign, with no significant
differences between noise and no-noise conditions. Thus, this
research provides some preliminary evidence for psychological
mechanisms underlying the detrimental effects of noise, suggest-
ing that generosity is effective in reducing detrimental effects of
noise because generosity helps to maintain or improve impressions
of benign intent.
At the same time, generosity should not be regarded as the only
or most effective way for coping with noise, as there may be some
limitations linked with implementing, or effectively communicat-
ing, generosity. To begin with, generosity by definition involves
giving a bit more than one has received, and one may not always
be able to do so. For example, one may simply lack the resources
to act in a generous manner or features of the dilemma may not
enable one to demonstrate such subtle generosity (e.g., one cannot
do so in so-called binary social dilemmas, with only two options:
cooperate or not). Moreover, generosity is a somewhat indirect
means of coping with noise, because a partner cannot infer from
generosity that, or when, outcomes are affected by noise. Thus,
notwithstanding the benefits of generosity, it is important to ex-
amine the effectiveness of less costly and more direct means, such
as communication, for coping with noise in social dilemmas.
Coping With Noise: Benefits of Communication
Previous research on social dilemmas has devoted a fair amount
of empirical attention to the effects of verbal communication in
social dilemmas (e.g., Caldwell, 1976; Dawes, McTavish, & Shak-
lee, 1977; Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994). Although researchers
expected that communication would promote cooperation, such
effects were not always obtained. Moreover, various mechanisms
have been proposed (e.g., promotion of trust, feelings of identity,
possibilities for coordination), and there is some insight into the
circumstances under which communication does—versus does
not—promote cooperation (e.g., variations in the degree to which
the message is binding, see Chen, 1996; Chen & Komorita, 1994;
Orbell, Van de Kragt, & Dawes, 1988).
We propose that the presence of negative noise may be a
situational factor that is essential to the functionality of commu-
nication, arguing that communication about noise can be an effec-
tive means of coping with noise in social dilemmas. Specifically,
informing the interaction partner when a particular outcome was
affected by noise may be helpful in reducing and perhaps over-
coming the presumed detrimental effects of noise. Why should
communication about noise be effective? We advance a line of
reasoning that is based on two broad arguments. The first argument
is that incidents of noise challenge impressions of benign intent.
Noise evokes ambiguity or uncertainty regarding the partner’s
benign intentions because, due to noise, observed behavior can be
perceived as intentional or unintentional. The second argument is
that impressions of a partner’s benign intentions are conditional for
behaving cooperatively and that any violation of such “benign
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impressions” will lead to diminished cooperation. For example,
most people exhibit very low levels of cooperation with partners
perceived as below average on trustworthiness, whereas they ex-
hibit high levels of cooperation with partners perceived as above
average on trustworthiness (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Van
Lange & Semin-Goossens, 1998). Also, individuals who are prone
to cooperate tend to switch rapidly to noncooperation after one
noncooperative choice by the partner, suggesting that even a single
failure to reciprocate cooperation may exert detrimental effects on
cooperative interaction (e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman
& Marshello, 1975).
In light of the detrimental effects of noise on impressions and
cooperative interaction, it becomes important to ask: How can one
“undo noise” in an effective manner? We suggest that communi-
cating about noise may serve the function of undoing noise by
clarifying when a particular outcome was affected by noise. As
such, communication about noise is linked to clarity (Axelrod,
1984), in the sense that the partner can infer from communication
when a particular outcome was affected by noise. Finally, com-
munication about noise may serve as a general reminder of noise,
making interaction partners aware of the fact that there may be
discrepancies between intended and actual interaction outcomes.
These lines of reasoning underscore the important function of
communication as a means of maintaining or improving impres-
sions of benign intent, which are assumed to be essential for
coping with noise in social dilemmas.
Hypotheses and Research Overview
The preceding discussion provides a framework for understand-
ing why noise may cause detrimental effects on cooperation and
how such unfortunate effects may be effectively reduced. The
present research is designed to test two central hypotheses derived
from this framework. First, we predicted that noise would exert
detrimental effects on levels of cooperation (Hypothesis 1a) and on
benign impressions of a partner (Hypothesis 1b). Second, we
predicted that communication about incidents of noise would
reduce such effects for cooperation (Hypothesis 2a) and for benign
impressions of a partner (Hypothesis 2b).
To test these hypotheses, the present research used a “gradual”
social dilemma task adopted from previous research (Van Lange et
al., 2002), which examined the degree of cooperation by asking
participants to decide how many coins out of 10 (which were twice
as valuable to the partner as to the participant) to give to the
partner. We examined this gradual social dilemma (rather than the
more frequently used binary social dilemma) for two reasons.
First, the gradual social dilemma captures a broad domain of
situations in real life (e.g., how much time or energy to devote to
a particular collective goal). Second, the gradual social dilemma
allows for behavior and strategies by which participants can com-
municate their intentions and goals much more profoundly (and
perhaps more effectively) than they can in a social dilemma
involving only a dichotomous choice (for further reasoning, see
Van Lange et al., 2002).
Furthermore, as noted earlier, the present research focused on
negative noise rather than positive noise because negative noise is
arguably more prevalent in the real world, more likely to be
noticed (or experienced) by the interaction partner, and more likely
to have detrimental effects on cooperation by eliciting both mis-
understanding and noncooperative interaction (i.e., the echo effect;
cf. Signorino, 1996). Moreover, we assume that communication
about noise—the major topic of the present research—in real life
is more likely to occur when something negative happens than
when something positive happens.
Study 1
The main goal of Study 1 was to test two central hypotheses: the
predicting of detrimental effects of noise on cooperation and
benign impressions (Hypotheses 1a and 1b) and the reducing of
such effects by communication (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). Accord-
ingly, we compared a condition without noise with a condition
with noise (to demonstrate detrimental effects of noise) and com-
pared these conditions with a condition with noise and with com-
munication (to examine the benefits of communication). We ex-
amined an iterated social dilemma, involving 53 interaction trials,
in which we varied partner’s strategy. Specifically, we examined a
partner who adopted TFT and a partner who adopted TFT 1 (i.e.,
a generous TFT partner), who always gave one coin more than the
partner gave in the previous interaction. The inclusion of these two
strategies allows us to examine whether the benefits of communi-
cation are independent of any possible benefit of generosity (see
also Kollock, 1993; Van Lange et al., 2002).
Method
Participants and experimental design. Participants were 134 under-
graduate students (71 women, 63 men; average age 21 years). They were
recruited at the campus of the Free University by written announcements
inviting individuals to participate in a study of decision making. The
experimental design was a 3 (condition of the task: noise absent vs. noise
present without communication vs. noise present with communication) 
2 (strategy of the partner: TFT vs. TFT  1)  9 (blocks of trials) design,
with the latter variable being a within-participant variable (this variable is
discussed later). In the following, we refer to the noise-absent condition as
the no-noise condition and to the two noise-present conditions as the
communication and no-communication conditions. The primary dependent
variables were level of cooperation and impressions of benign intent.
Procedure. From 6 to 14 participants attended each research session.
Participants were welcomed and escorted to individual cubicles to prevent
them from communicating with each other. Each cubicle contained a
computer with a monitor and a keyboard. The instructions and the entire
experiment were computerized. Participants were told that they could
consult the experimenter if they had problems understanding the instruc-
tions. After answering some questionnaires from an unrelated study, par-
ticipants took part in one of the six conditions of the experiment (randomly
determined), which consisted of a social dilemma task and a postexperi-
mental questionnaire. The studies lasted about 75 min, and on completion,
participants were debriefed, thanked for their participation, and paid 15
Dutch Guilders (which equaled approximately $7 in American currency or
Euro 7 in European currency).
Measuring cooperation in a social dilemma. The experiment started
with an explanation to participants that the computers in the different
cubicles were connected and that they would be randomly paired to interact
by computer in a decision task for several trials. Next, participants read the
instructions of the social dilemma task, which was adopted from previous
research (Van Lange et al., 2002). Each trial of the social dilemma offered
participants a choice among 11 options, varying systematically from least
to most cooperative. The social dilemma was presented as a “give-some”
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situation in which each participant received 10 coins at the beginning of
every trial and could choose among giving no coins, 1 coin, 2 coins, up to
maximally 10 coins to the other. Each coin had a value of NFL 0.50 to the
person him- or herself and a value of NFL 1.00 (approximately US$0.48)
to the partner. Similarly, each coin held by the partner had a value of NFL
0.50 to the partner and a value of NFL 1.00 to the participant him- or
herself. Maximal cooperation is to give 10 coins (i.e., joint well-being is
better served by exchanging more coins), and maximal noncooperation is
to give no coins (i.e., personal well-being is better served by giving fewer
coins to the partner).
The number of coins and the consequences of giving away coins were
displayed on the participant’s computer screen. Specifically, the computer
screen displayed a “virtual table,” divided into the participant’s side on
which 10 green coins for the participant were displayed (“you”) and the
partner’s side on which 10 blue coins for the partner were displayed (“the
other”). The coins that were given away by the participant literally moved
from the participant’s side to the partner’s side of the table, and vice versa
for the coins given away by the partner. The outcomes with which the
participant and the partner preceded and ended an interaction were dis-
played at the right of the table. Finally, throughout the interactions, we used
variable time intervals for displaying the coins given by the partner to
mimic the variability in decision time that characterizes the choices of real
people in social dilemmas.
The social dilemma task included eight equivalent blocks of six trials
and a ninth block of five trials, as is discussed shortly. Participants were not
informed about the total number of 53 trials, but they were informed that
before proceeding to the next trial they would receive information about
the partner’s choice and the partner would receive information about the
participant’s choice. After explaining the social dilemma task, we admin-
istered 10 questions to check comprehension of the task, which revealed
good comprehension by all participants (i.e., a mean score of 9.42 of 10).
Because the experimental task used coins, which represented hypothet-
ical amounts of money, we sought to increase the value of the coins by
noting that participants would increase the odds of receiving an extra
reward of 25 Dutch Guilders (approximately $12 in American currency) as
they accumulated a greater amount of money in the experimental task. That
is, we stated that the amount of money (coins) accumulated for themselves
corresponded to a number of tickets in a raffle for the extra reward, making
clear that their changes would increase by the amount of money they
accumulated for themselves, not by the amount of money they accumulated
more than others (i.e., we used an absolute standard, and the number of
certificates was not fixed). In the actual raffle, held after the entire exper-
iment was completed, each participant had an equal chance of winning one
of five extra rewards (for a comparable procedure, see Van Lange et al.,
2002; Van Lange & Visser, 1999).
Manipulation of partner’s strategy. Both TFT and TFT  1 were
programmed to begin by giving 6 coins. We decided to make both pre-
programmed strategies start in Trial 1 by giving 6 coins (moderate coop-
eration) instead of 10 coins (maximal cooperation) because we know from
previous research that hardly any real person gives 10 coins at the first trial
(Van Lange et al., 2002). By starting with 6 coins, the behavior of the
preprogrammed partner was realistic, whereas at the same time this partner
showed good intentions (cooperation exceeded the midpoint of possible
cooperation). In subsequent trials, TFT was programmed to give the same
number of coins as the participant gave in the previous trial, and TFT  1
was programmed to give the same number of coins as the participant gave
in the previous trial plus 1 coin extra.
Because no more coins than the maximum of 10 coins could be given,
TFT  1 could not pursue adding 1 coin if the participant gave 10 coins in
the previous trial. In these instances, TFT 1 was programmed to give the
maximum of 10 coins. It appeared that, on average, the 67 participants
interacting with TFT  1 gave 10 coins in about 17 of the 53 trials (M 
17.01), indicating that TFT  1 actually gave 1 coin more than it received
in 67.9% of the interaction trials.1
Manipulation of noise. Prior to making choices in the social dilemma
task, participants in the two noise-present conditions were told that we
were interested in examining situations in which there may be discrepan-
cies between decisions intended by one person and the observation of this
decision by another person. Next, we explained that, for this reason, the
computer would change choices of one of the partners every now and then
(for similar instructions, see Van Lange et al., 2002). The incidents of noise
were illustrated by an example so that participants could see how the
computer might change choices and how the computer would inform the
actor about such changes. The instructions emphasized that, although the
actor would receive information when his or her choice had been changed,
the partner would not be informed about a change in actor’s intended
choice. So, participants could never be sure whether the number of coins
given to them by the partner was the result of an intended choice or the
result of a choice changed by computer. At the end of the noise instruc-
tions, which were obviously not included in the no-noise condition, par-
ticipants were led to believe that the computer had randomly determined
that the choices of their partner (and not their own choices) would be
changed in some trials.2
As noted earlier, the social dilemma task included 53 interaction trials,
consisting of eight structurally equivalent blocks of trials, in that each
block began with 5 normal trials followed by a 6th trial involving noise,
and a final ninth block of trials, which included only 5 normal trials. The
final block of trials, Block 9, did not end with a trial involving noise
because this trial could not affect subsequent levels of cooperation. In this
way noise affected choices at every 6th trial (Trial 6, Trial 12, and so on)
with a total of 8 out of the 53 trials, which makes the frequency of noise
15%.
Incidents of noise were operationalized by subtracting two or three coins
from the “intended” choice of the preprogrammed partner. This intended
choice was based on the former choice of the participant, following TFT or
TFT  1, as explained earlier. We alternated between subtractions of two
and three coins to induce some randomness to the noise intensity, starting
with an intensity of three coins in Trial 6, two coins in Trial 12, three coins
in Trial 18, and so on. Whenever the preprogrammed partner intended to
give fewer than two or three coins, noise involved the maximal number of
coins that could be subtracted from the intended choice. Of course, when
the partner intended to give zero coins, negative noise could not affect that
intended choice. Indeed, it is impossible to completely prevent such “no-
hits” (see Van Lange et al., 2002). Also, with an eye on everyday inter-
1 On average, the 134 participants gave 10 coins in about 16 of the 53
trials (M 16.19). There was no difference in this percentage of maximum
cooperation (30.6%) between participants interacting with TFT or with
TFT  1. Further, a main effect of condition and planned comparisons
revealed that this percentage was significantly lower in the no-
communication condition (22.3%) than in both the no-noise condition
(39.7%) and the communication condition (29.5%). Generally, these find-
ings are not surprising because, as outlined earlier, noise without commu-
nication should exert detrimental effects on level of cooperation, including
the frequency of maximal cooperation.
2 We programmed noise in such a manner as to affect only choices of the
preprogrammed partner (and not to affect choices of the participant). The
primary reason was that we were interested in examining whether a
manipulation at the partner’s side (communication about noise) was suf-
ficient to overcome detrimental effects of the actor’s (i.e., participant’s)
cooperation. Moreover, an earlier study revealed that the effects of noise on
cooperation are independent of whether noise affects a participant’s
choices, a partner’s choices, or both of their choices (Van Lange et al.,
2002).
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actions, the prevention of no-hits would be unrealistic, because the pres-
ence of no-hits resembles situations in reality: Whenever someone decides
not to cooperate at all, level of cooperation cannot become less by acci-
dental feuds. No-hits cannot occur with TFT 1, as this strategy will never
intend to give zero coins. It appeared that with TFT, on average, noise did
not influence choices in fewer than two of eight noise incidents (the mean
number of no-hits was M  1.80).3
Manipulation of communication. Prior to the social dilemma task,
participants in the communication condition were told that one of both
partners would be given the opportunity to send a maximum of 10 mes-
sages to the other person. Additionally, participants were informed that (a)
this opportunity would only be given after some interaction trials, (b)
messages could only be sent after outcomes of a trial had been displayed,
(c) the messages could not exceed 30 words, and (d) the content of the
messages had to be relevant to the interaction. The instructions also
explained how to send and how to receive messages. Thereafter, we
informed participants that a lottery would determine who would be able to
send messages (and who not). The (actually bogus) result of the lottery was
always that the partner, and not the participant, was able to send messages.
Because we were particularly interested in examining the ability of
communication to reduce the detrimental effects of noise, we programmed
the messages to be sent after trials that were affected by noise. More
specifically, the messages were sent after Trial 6, Trial 12, Trial 24, Trial
30, Trial 36, and Trial 48 (i.e., six out of the eight noise trials).4 The
messages explained the former incident of noise, stated each time in
slightly different words; for example “I wanted to give you six coins, but
the computer changed my decision. I think you only received three coins.”
The first message (after Trial 6) and the fourth message (after Trial 30)
ended with an apology such as “I’m sorry” to capture the everyday-life
nature of communication and thus to prevent the messages from looking
artificial. We reasoned that apologizing every now and then is something
people often do quite naturally in case things go wrong, even when these
situations are caused by external events.
Communication was only referring to actual noise (and no message was
sent in case of a no-hit). It appeared that all 40 participants in the
communication condition received at least two messages, whereas 32 of
them received the maximum of six messages (M  5.58).
Measuring impressions of benign intent. On completion of the social
dilemma task, participants proceeded with a postexperimental question-
naire, including 11 items assessing impressions of benign intent during the
interaction (cf. Van Lange et al., 2002). Positive items were “the other
was” [stem] . . . “generous,” “nice,” “forgiving,” “kind,” and “trustwor-
thy,” and negative items were “the other was” [stem] . . . “self-centered,”
“greedy,” “competitive,” “stingy,” “vengeful,” and “selfish” (Cronbach’s
  .85). Participants could indicate how much they agreed with these
statements on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
Results and Discussion
In the following analyses, we examine level of cooperation in a
3 (condition: no noise vs. no communication vs. communica-
tion)  2 (strategy: TFT vs. TFT  1)  9 (blocks of trials)
analysis of variance, with the latter variable being a within-
participant variable. We examine benign impressions in a 3 (con-
dition: no noise vs. communication vs. no communication)  2
(strategy: TFT vs. TFT  1) analysis of variance. Because we
hypothesized that noise exerts detrimental effects on cooperation
(Hypothesis 1a) and benign impressions (Hypothesis 1b), and that
these effects can be sufficiently reduced by communication (Hy-
potheses 2a and 2b), we argue that levels of cooperation and
benign impressions are lower under conditions in which noise is
presumed to exert detrimental effects (i.e., no communication)
than under conditions in which either noise is absent (i.e., no noise)
or communication could help reduce the detrimental effects of
noise (i.e., communication). To test these hypotheses, we com-
puted two hypothesis-relevant orthogonal contrasts for both de-
pendent variables. One contrast, which we refer to as the first
contrast, compares the no-communication condition with both the
no-noise condition and the communication condition. The other
contrast, to which we refer as the second contrast, allows us to test
differences between the no-noise and communication conditions.
Level of cooperation. A 3 (condition)  2 (strategy)  9
(blocks of trials) analysis of variance revealed the hypothesized
detrimental effect of noise and the positive effect of communica-
tion: Participants in the no-communication condition exhibited
lower levels of cooperation (M  4.95, SD  2.84) than did
participants in the no-noise condition (M  6.11, SD  2.94) and
in the communication condition (M  5.81, SD  2.63). Although
the main effect of condition failed to reach significance, F(2,
128)  2.24, p  .110, planned comparisons indeed revealed that
the first contrast was significant, F(1, 128)  4.31, p  .05,
whereas the second contrast revealed no significant effect, F(1,
128) 0.17, ns. Thus, we found support for the hypotheses: Noise
exerted detrimental effects on level of cooperation (Hypothesis
1a), and the presence of communication reduced these detrimental
effects of noise to such extent that cooperation in the communi-
cation condition did not significantly differ from cooperation in the
no-noise condition (Hypothesis 2a).
Of lesser importance, we also observed a main effect of strategy,
F(1, 128)  5.68, p  .05, indicating that independent of condi-
tion, participants who interacted with TFT exhibited lower levels
of cooperation (M  5.05, SD  2.85) than did participants who
interacted with TFT  1 (M  6.18, SD  2.73). No interactions
between condition and strategy or contrasts and strategy were
found (all Fs  .05, all ps  .84). Moreover, we observed a main
effect of blocks of trial, F(8, 121)  6.75, p  .001, whereas there
were no significant interaction effects involving blocks of trials. It
appeared that, independent of condition and strategy, level of
cooperation increased gradually over the first five blocks (Ms 
4.53, 5.38, 5.64, 5.78, 6.05, in Blocks 1 through 5, respectively),
after which level of cooperation decreased somewhat in Block 6
(M  5.63) and increased again over the last three blocks (Ms 
5.61, 5.82, 6.19, in Blocks 7 through 9, respectively). Pairwise
3 The number of no-hits in the no-communication condition with TFT
(M  2.26) was somewhat higher than in the communication condition
with TFT (M  1.29). This is not surprising, because, as we show in the
results section, level of cooperation was higher in the communication
condition than in the no-communication condition.
4 We decided not to program a message after each noise trial, because we
reasoned that it would be more realistic if the partner used the messages
somewhat sparingly: Participants were told that their partners could only
send 10 messages and, just like themselves, did not know how many trials
there would be in total. At the same time, we wanted to inform participants
as completely as possible about incidents of noise. Hence, whenever noise
actually affected the partner’s choice at Trial 18 and Trial 42 (i.e., the noise
trials after which no messages were sent), the next message (after Trial 24
and Trial 48) was extended with information about this former incident
(e.g., “Some trials ago, the computer also gave you less than I intended. I
didn’t send you a message at that time.”).
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comparisons revealed significant differences between Blocks 1
and 2, 5 and 6, and 8 and 9 (all ts  2.21, all ps  .05). 5
Benign impressions. Benign impressions of the partner were
analyzed in a 3 (condition: no noise vs. communication vs. no
communication)  2 (strategy of the partner: TFT vs. TFT  1)
analysis of variance, which revealed a main effect of condition,
F(2, 128)  5.70, p  .01. This main effect indicated that partic-
ipants in the no-communication condition formed less-benign im-
pressions of their partner (M  4.46, SD  1.13) than did partic-
ipants in the no-noise condition (M  5.09, SD  0.83) and the
communication condition (M  4.83, SD  0.97). Indeed, as for
level of cooperation, planned comparisons revealed the hypothe-
sized negative effect of noise and the positive effect of communi-
cation: The first contrast was significant, F(1, 128)  9.84, p 
.01, whereas the second contrast revealed no significant effect,
F(1, 128)  1.56, ns. Thus, noise exerted detrimental effects on
benign impressions of the partner (Hypothesis 1b), and the pres-
ence of communication could overcome these detrimental effects
of noise (Hypothesis 2b). Of lesser importance, as for level of
cooperation, a main effect of strategy was found, F(1, 128) 
17.15, p  .001, which revealed that impressions of a TFT partner
were less benign (M  4.45, SD  1.06) than were impressions of
a TFT  1 partner (M  5.12, SD  0.84). No interactions
between condition and strategy or contrasts and strategy were
found.
Mediation by benign impressions. Is there evidence that be-
nign impressions might mediate the effects observed for level of
cooperation? At the outset, we note that, conceptually, benign
impressions should both (a) summarize the evaluations of past
behavior and interactions and (b) guide behavior and interactions
in future trials. However, benign impressions were assessed only
after the social dilemma task because we did not want the mea-
surement of impressions to affect behavior and interaction in the
social dilemma task. Hence, from the perspective of testing medi-
ation, this order of measurement can only yield preliminary evi-
dence because the presumed mediator (i.e., benign impressions)
was assessed after we measured the criterion variable (i.e., level of
cooperation).
Nevertheless, these analyses revealed some interesting patterns
relevant to the mediating role of benign impressions. First, recall
that the first contrast (i.e., no communication vs. communication
and no noise) was significant for both benign impressions (i.e., the
presumed mediator) and cooperation (i.e., the presumed criterion).
Second, as expected, benign impressions and cooperation were
significantly correlated (r  .34, p  .01). Third, a regression
analysis in which cooperation is regressed onto the first contrast,
strategy, the interaction, and benign impressions revealed a signif-
icant effect for benign impressions (  .287, t(134)  3.14, p 
.01). Fourth, we tested whether the reductions in the main effects
and interaction effect were significant (Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger,
1998).6 It appeared that the inclusion of benign impressions caused
a decline in the variance accounted for by the first contrast (from
  .175, t(134)  2.07, p  .05 to   .104, t(134)  1.23, ns),
a significant reduction (Z  2.28, p  .05).
Thus, the findings revealed evidence (albeit preliminary) in
support of the argument that the “positive” effects of communica-
tion on cooperation are mediated by benign impressions. Of lesser
relevance, benign impressions also appeared to mediate the main
effect of strategy on cooperation—from   .197, t(134)  2.23,
p  .05, to   .085, t(134)  0.92, ns; a significant reduction
(Z 2.58, p .01). Although not hypothesis relevant, this finding
suggests the importance of benign impressions as an explanatory
variable of cooperation in social dilemmas.
To summarize, consistent with the hypotheses predicting detri-
mental effects of noise, noise exerted detrimental effects on coop-
eration levels toward a partner and on benign impressions of this
partner (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). Moreover, consistent with the
hypotheses predicting positive effects of communication, commu-
nication about noise appeared to reduce or even overcome these
detrimental effects on cooperation and benign impressions (Hy-
potheses 2a and 2b). Both effects generalized across two different
types of partner’s strategy, in that TFT and TFT  1 partners
benefited from communication to roughly the same degree. Fi-
nally, Study 1 revealed preliminary evidence suggesting that be-
nign impressions mediated the positive effects of communication
on cooperation, adding credence to the argument that communi-
cation serves to maintain impressions of benign intent, which in
turn are important to reducing or overcoming detrimental effects of
noise on cooperation.
Study 2
Study 2 was designed to test Hypotheses 1a through 2b, thereby
seeking to extend and complement Study 1 in two theoretically
important respects. First, as noted earlier, our framework assumed
that “negative noise challenges impressions of benign intent,” in
that negative outcomes, and the ambiguity regarding the intended
action by the partner, should lead to uncertainty regarding the
partner’s benign intent. Therefore, prior to the social dilemma task,
Study 2 assessed differences in dispositional trust, defined as
differences in the general belief in human benevolence or the
default expectation of the trustworthiness of people in general
(Van Lange, Van Vugt, Meertens, & Ruiter, 1998; Yamagishi,
1986, 1988; Yamagishi & Kakiuchi, 2000). Previous research on
5 Previous research has revealed that level of cooperation may exhibit an
increase, a decrease, or no change at all over interaction trials. Generally,
these different findings can be understood in terms of several differences
among these studies, including differences in partner’s strategy (e.g., TFT
tends to generate increases in cooperation in social dilemmas without
noise; see Van Lange & Visser, 1999), gradual versus binary social
dilemmas, detail of instructions, whether the outcomes represent value, and
differences in sample characteristics. It is interesting that the decline in
Block 6 followed by a subsequent increase in cooperation is similar to the
U-shaped pattern observed by Rapoport and Chammah (1965). This
U-shaped pattern may reflect the idea that people learn from the actual
experience of mutual noncooperation (e.g., see Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977).
However, the meaning and robustness of the decline in cooperation in
Block 6 awaits further research, because, as the reader will see, Study 2 did
not replicate the decline in cooperation at any block of trials.
6 We used a formula discussed at: http://nw3.nai.net/dakenny/mediate
.htm (see Kenny et al., 1998). This approach, which is more conservative
than several alternative approaches toward testing mediation (e.g., see
MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002) was used in both
Studies 1 and 2. Also, we note that an analysis of variance in which benign
impressions was included as a covariate also rendered the first contrast
nonsignificant.
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social dilemmas without noise has revealed that individuals with
high trust tend to exhibit greater cooperation than individuals with
low trust, even though such differences do not tend to be large, are
not consistently observed, and sometimes are only revealed in
interaction with other variables (e.g., Brann & Foddy, 1987; Parks,
1994; Parks, Henager, & Scamahorn, 1996; Van Lange et al.,
1998). Because our framework assumes that incidents of negative
noise challenge impressions of benign intent, we argue that dif-
ferences between individuals with low and high levels of trust
should be more pronounced under conditions in which noise is
presumed to exert detrimental effects (i.e., no communication)
than under conditions in which noise is absent (i.e., no noise) or
communication helps to reduce the detrimental effects of noise
(i.e., communication). Thus, our general hypothesis states that
differences between low and high trust on cooperation (Hypothesis
3a) and impressions (Hypothesis 3b) are greater in the no-
communication condition than in the no-noise or the communica-
tion condition.
Second, Study 1 examined impressions of benign intent by
assessing global judgments of the partner, as used in previous
research (e.g., “trustworthy” and “generous” vs. “self-centered”
and “vengeful”). However, such global impressions are likely to be
rooted in perceptions of the specific interaction goals, which
underlie behavior (i.e., perceived transformations; Kelley &
Thibaut, 1978). In assessing such interaction goals, we examined
three prosocial goals and two proself goals. Prosocial goals were
tendencies toward enhancing joint outcomes (MaxJoint), minimiz-
ing (absolute) differences between own and partner’s outcomes
(MinDiff), and enhancing the partner’s outcomes (MaxOther); and
proself goals were tendencies toward enhancing relative advantage
over partner’s outcomes (MaxRel) and enhancing one’s own out-
comes (MaxOwn). Assessing these interaction goals allows us to
test Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b in a comprehensive and specific
manner, thereby providing greater insight into the perception of
specific interaction goals that are most strongly challenged by
noise. Moreover, assessing these transformations allows us to
illuminate the mediating role of perceptions of specific interaction
goals in accounting for the detrimental effects of noise and the
positive effects of communication in reducing such detrimental
effects.
Method
Participants and experimental design. Participants were 94 undergrad-
uate students (55 women, 39 men; average age 21 years). As in Study 1,
they were recruited at the campus of the Free University. The experimental
design was a 3 (condition of the task: noise absent vs. noise present without
communication vs. noise present with communication)  2 (interpersonal
trust: high vs. low)  9 (blocks of trials) design, with the latter variable
being a within-participant variable. As in Study 1, we refer to the three task
conditions as the no-noise, no-communication, and communication condi-
tions. The dependent variables were level of cooperation and impressions
of benign intent, including perceptions of specific interaction goals.
Procedure. The procedure of Study 2 was identical to the procedure of
Study 1, except for three differences. First, in Study 2 participants only
started reading the task instructions (which were comprehended well; i.e.,
a mean score of 9.55 correct answers out of 10 questions of the compre-
hension check) after assessing their interpersonal trust, followed by a 7-min
filler task, which included perceptions and judgments of colors. Second,
the postexperimental questionnaires on partner impressions included addi-
tional questions regarding three prosocial and two proself goals. Third,
because the findings of TFT and TFT  1 partners were similar for the
three conditions in Study 1, we decided to examine only a partner pursuing
TFT.
Measuring dispositional trust. Participants’ level of trust was mea-
sured using a Dutch translation of Yamagishi’s (1986, 1992) Interpersonal
Trust Scale (e.g., Van Lange et al., 1998). Participants had to indicate how
much they agree with eight different statements on scales ranging from 1
(not at all) to 7 (very much). Higher scores indicate lower trust (e.g., “You
should not trust others, unless you know them very well.”). This frequently
used scale exhibited reasonable reliability in the present study (  .73).
On the basis of a simple median split on the overall scale score, we labeled
48 participants as high trusters (participants with a mean score of 3.63 or
lower) and 46 participants as low trusters (participants with a mean score
higher than 3.63).7
Noise and communication. As in Study 1, we calculated whether all
preprogrammed incidents of noise and communication actually occurred
during the interaction. It appeared that in Study 2, on average, noise did not
influence choices in about one of the eight noise incidents in total (no-hit
M  1.34).8 As in Study 1, messages were only sent after noise actually
affected a choice. It appeared that of the 29 participants in the communi-
cation condition, 18 participants received the maximum amount of six
messages, whereas none of the participants received fewer than two mes-
sages (M  5.41). Trust was not related to the number of received
messages.
Measuring impressions of benign intent. On completion of the social
dilemma task, participants proceeded with a postexperimental question-
naire. First, we assessed impressions of benign intent with the same 11
items used in Study 1 (Study 2,   .84). Second, 15 items assessed
participants’ impressions of the partner’s prosocial and proself interaction
goals. Each goal was indicated by 3 items, which exhibited good internal
reliability: MaxJoint,   .84 (e.g., “the other person wanted to get the
most outcomes for the two of us”); MinDiff,   .85 (e.g., “the other
person wanted to minimize the differences in outcomes between me and
him or her”); MaxOther,   .74 (e.g., “the other person wanted me to get
the most outcomes”); MaxRel,   .92 (e.g., “the other person wanted to
get more outcomes than I did”); MaxOwn,   .85 (e.g., “the other person
wanted to get as many outcomes as possible for him- or herself ”).
Results and Discussion
As in Study 1, the social dilemma task involved 53 trials,
consisting of eight equivalent blocks of 5 trials without noise and
1 trial with noise and of a ninth block of only 5 trials without noise.
7 In determining our strategy of analyses, we considered both regression
analysis and analysis of variance using median split for trust. Although
regression analysis has clear advantages, we report the results obtained in
analyses of variance (see also Parks et al., 1996; Van Lange et al., 1998;
Yamagishi & Cook, 1993). The primary reason was that the data for trust
revealed a rather substantial violation of normality in the distribution, with
the scores for trust exhibiting a bimodal distribution in which two clusters
of peak values were observed (one between scores of 2.25 and 2.75, and
one between scores of 3.75 and 4.25). The scores of only 2 participants
(2.1%) equaled the median value (3.625). Exclusion of these participants
did not change the results.
8 As in Study 1, the number of no-hits in the no-communication condi-
tion (M 1.80) was somewhat higher than in the communication condition
(M  0.79). This is not surprising, because, as we show in the results
section, level of cooperation was higher in the communication condition
than in the no-communication condition. Trust was not related to the
number of no-hits.
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In the following analyses, we examine level of cooperation in a 3
(condition: no noise vs. communication vs. no communication) 
2 (interpersonal trust: high vs. low)  9 (blocks of trials) analysis
of variance, with the latter variable being a within-participant
variable. We examined partner impressions by performing a 3
(condition: no noise vs. communication vs. no communication) 
2 (interpersonal trust: high vs. low) analysis of variance for each
impression. To test the central hypotheses, we computed the same
orthogonal contrasts as in Study 1 for each of the dependent
variables: (a) the first contrast, which compares the no-
communication condition with both the no-noise condition and the
communication condition, and (b) the second contrast, which
compares the no-noise condition with the communication
condition.
Level of cooperation. A 3 (condition)  2 (trust)  9 (blocks
of trials) analysis of variance revealed a main effect of condition,
F(2, 88)  5.04, p  .01, indicating that participants in the
no-communication condition (M  4.51, SD  3.00) exhibited
lower levels of cooperation than did participants in the no-noise
condition (M  6.07, SD  2.91) and in the communication
condition (M  6.32, SD  2.44). Indeed, planned comparisons
revealed the hypothesized positive effect of communication: The
first contrast was significant, F(1, 88)  9.83, p  .002, whereas
the second contrast revealed no significant effect, F(1, 88)  0.24,
ns. No main effect of trust was found, F(1, 88)  1.02, ns. Thus,
as did Study 1, Study 2 provides good support for the central
hypotheses, in that noise exerted detrimental effects on level of
cooperation (Hypothesis 1a), and communication was effective at
reducing these detrimental effects (Hypothesis 2a).
More important, this main effect was qualified by an interaction
between condition and trust, F(2, 88)  4.85, p  .01. As can be
seen in Table 1 (Level of cooperation section), high trusters
exhibited about the same level of cooperation across all three
conditions, whereas low trusters exhibited lower levels of cooper-
ation in the no-communication condition than they did in both the
no-noise and the communication conditions. Indeed, planned com-
parisons revealed a significant interaction between trust and the
first contrast, F(1, 88)  7.62, p  .01, whereas the interaction
between trust and the second contrast was not significant, F(1,
88)  2.08, ns.
Thus, we found support for the central hypothesis: Differences
between high and low trusters in level of cooperation were more
pronounced in the no-communication condition than in the no-
noise condition or the communication condition (Hypothesis 3a).
Specifically, noise exerted detrimental effects on cooperation only
for low trusters and, as a result, only for these participants could
the detrimental effects be overcome by communication.9 Finally, a
main effect of blocks of trials was found, F(8, 81)  3.82, p 
.001. It appeared that overall level of cooperation increased grad-
ually over the first five blocks (Ms  4.76, 5.28, 5.57, 5.36, 5.85,
in Blocks 1 through 5, respectively—with significant or marginal
differences between Blocks 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and 4 and 5; all ts 
1.87, all ps  .07), after which levels of cooperation remained
essentially the same (Ms  5.81, 5.86, 5.80, 5.85, in Blocks 6
through 9, respectively).10
Benign impressions. Benign impressions were analyzed in a 3
(condition)  2 (trust) analysis of variance, which revealed effects
that were similar to those observed for level of cooperation. First,
a main effect of condition, F(2, 88)  10.91, p  .001, revealed
that impressions of partners in the no-communication condition
were less benign (M  3.94, SD  0.99) than impressions of
partners in the no-noise condition (M  4.85, SD  0.89) and in
the communication condition (M  4.73, SD  0.84). Indeed,
planned comparisons revealed the hypothesized detrimental effect
of noise and the positive effect of communication: The first con-
trast was significant, F(1, 88)  21.73, p  .001, whereas the
second contrast was not significant, F(1, 88)  0.09, ns. No main
effect of trust was found, F(1, 88)  0.03, ns. Thus, as for level of
cooperation, noise exerted detrimental effects on benign impres-
sions (Hypothesis 1b), and the presence of communication could
reduce the detrimental effects of noise (Hypothesis 2b).
More important, the main effect of condition was again qualified
by an interaction between condition and trust, F(2, 88) 7.83, p
.001. As can be seen in Table 1 (Benign impressions section) the
impressions held by high trusters were quite similar for the three
conditions, whereas the impressions held by low trusters were
quite different for the three conditions. Low trusters in the no-
communication condition formed less-benign impressions of their
partners than did low trusters in both the no-noise condition and
the communication condition. As for level of cooperation, planned
comparisons revealed a significant interaction between trust and
9 Note that the interaction between trust and the second contrast was not
significant. Hence, we regard further speculation about the seemingly high
level of cooperation for low trusters in the communication condition (M 
7.20, SD  1.73) irrelevant.
10 The analysis also revealed a marginal interaction between condition,
trust, and blocks of trials, F(16, 162) 1.58, p .08. Planned comparisons
revealed a significant interaction between the first contrast with blocks of
trials and trust, F(8, 81)  2.42, p  .05, whereas the second contrast did
not interact with blocks of trials and trust. The pattern of levels of
cooperation over blocks of trials showed that high trusters, independent of
condition, started with a reasonable level of cooperation, which remained
rather stable over time. Low trusters started with lower levels of cooper-
ation, but increased their level of cooperation over time in both the
no-noise condition and the communication condition; whereas low trusters
in the no-communication condition did not increase their level of cooper-
ation over time. The means relevant to this interaction are available from
the authors. There was no interaction between blocks of trials and trust,
F(8, 81)  1.26, ns.
Table 1
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Level of Cooperation and
Benign Impressions as a Function of Condition and Trust
Dependent variable/trust
Condition
No noise Communication
No
communication
Level of cooperation
Low trusters 5.84 (3.13) 7.20 (1.73) 3.12 (2.21)
High trusters 6.38 (2.68) 5.70 (2.71) 5.82 (3.11)
Overall 6.07 (2.91) 6.32 (2.44) 4.51 (3.00)
Benign impressions
Low trusters 5.14 (0.97) 4.84 (0.75) 3.44 (1.01)
High trusters 4.48 (0.64) 4.65 (0.91) 4.40 (0.72)
Overall 4.85 (0.89) 4.73 (0.84) 3.94 (0.99)
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the first contrast, F(1, 88)  14.55, p  .001, whereas the inter-
action between trust and the second contrast was not significant,
F(1, 88)  1.11, ns. Thus, we found support for Hypothesis 3b,
predicting that differences in low versus high trust would be more
pronounced in the no-communication condition than in the no-
noise condition or the communication condition.
Impressions of partner’s interaction goals. Impressions of the
partner’s interaction goals were analyzed using 3 (condition)  2
(trust) analyses of variance. For ease of interpretation, the F values
of these main effects are presented in Table 2 (Simple main effects
section) in the Condition column. As can be seen, the analysis
revealed significant main effects of condition for each of the
prosocial transformations (i.e., MaxJoint, MinDiff, and MaxOther)
and both proself transformations (i.e., MaxOwn and MaxRel). The
means relevant to these effects are summarized in Table 3 in the
Overall rows and reveal that participants in the no-communication
condition formed less-strong prosocial impressions as well as
stronger proself impressions of their partner than did participants
in the no-noise condition and the communication condition. In-
deed, the first contrast was significant for all five interaction goals,
as can be seen in the first part of Table 2 (First contrast column),
indicating that communication could overcome detrimental effects
of noise on impressions of prosocial goals and proself goals.11
Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 1b, noise exerted detrimental
effects on the impressions of the partner’s goals (i.e., participants
ascribed lower levels of prosocial goals and higher levels of
proself goals to their partners). Consistent with Hypothesis 2b,
communicating about noise significantly reduced the detrimental
effects of noise on impressions of prosocial and proself goals.
Moreover, for two prosocial goals (i.e., MaxJoint and MinDiff)
and one proself goal (i.e., MaxRel) the main effects were qualified
by interactions between trust and condition. The F values of the interactions between trust and condition and between trust and the
contrasts for all goals can be found in Table 2 (Interactions with
trust section). More important, planned comparisons for MaxJoint,
MinDiff, and MaxRel revealed significant interactions of trust and
the first contrast, whereas the interactions between trust and the
second contrast were not significant (see Table 2, First contrast and
Second contrast sections). The means relevant to these interactions
are summarized in Table 3 and reveal that, for high trusters,
impressions of MaxJoint, MinDiff, and MaxRel of the partner
were hardly affected by condition, whereas, for low trusters, im-
pressions of MaxJoint and MinDiff were less strong and impres-
sions of MaxRel were stronger in the no-communication condition
than they were in both the no-noise and the communication con-
dition. For impressions of MaxOther and MaxOwn, no interactions
between trust and contrasts were found.
Mediation analyses. Complementing the mediation analyses
in Study 1, we examined the ability of both impressions of benign
intent and impressions of specific interaction goals to mediate both
the detrimental effects of noise and the positive effects of com-
munication in coping with noise. Also, as in Study 1, because we
assessed these impressions after behavior and interactions in the
social dilemma, the evidence should be regarded as preliminary.
11 Additionally, for MaxOther, the second contrast was significant (see
Table 2, Second contrast heading), indicating that the positive effect of
communication was even stronger than hypothesized.
Table 2
An Overview of F Values Associated With the Effects of
Condition and Trust on Partner Impressions
Partner impression
Condition
F(2, 88)
First contrast
F(1, 88)
Second contrast
F(1, 88)
Simple main effects
MaxJoint 7.84*** 15.66*** 0.02
MinDiff 7.35*** 13.69*** 1.02
MaxOther 9.03*** 12.55*** 5.51*
MaxRel 5.21** 10.21** 0.21
MaxOwn 4.91** 9.79** 0.03
Interactions with trust
MaxJoint 3.74* 7.40** 0.09
MinDiff 3.03† 6.05* 0.00
MaxOther 0.96 1.37 0.54
MaxRel 3.24* 6.40* 0.07
MaxOwn 1.62 1.65 1.59
Note. The first contrast compares the no-communication condition with
both the no-noise condition and the communication condition. The second
contrast compares the no-noise condition with the communication condi-
tion. MaxJoint  tendencies toward enhancing joint outcomes; MinDiff 
minimizing (absolute) differences between own and partner’s outcomes;
MaxOther  enhancing the partner’s outcome; MaxRel  tendencies
toward enhancing relative advantage over partner’s outcomes; MaxOwn 
enhancing one’s own outcomes.
† p  .053. * p  .05. ** p  .01. *** p  .001.
Table 3
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Partner Impressions as a
Function of Condition and Trust
Dependent variable/trust
Condition
No noise Communication
No
communication
MaxJoint
Low trusters 5.65 (1.32) 5.58 (1.28) 3.51 (1.66)
High trusters 5.10 (1.35) 5.28 (1.47) 4.80 (1.61)
Overall 5.41 (1.34) 5.40 (1.38) 4.17 (1.74)
MinDiff
Low trusters 6.08 (1.35) 5.72 (1.54) 4.04 (1.70)
High trusters 5.85 (0.97) 5.45 (1.29) 5.28 (1.47)
Overall 5.98 (1.18) 5.56 (1.37) 4.68 (1.68)
MaxOther
Low trusters 3.04 (1.09) 4.00 (1.29) 2.31 (1.13)
High trusters 2.95 (1.59) 3.45 (0.90) 2.59 (1.41)
Overall 3.00 (1.30) 3.68 (1.09) 2.46 (1.13)
MaxRel
Low trusters 2.80 (1.47) 2.72 (1.28) 4.73 (1.71)
High trusters 3.39 (1.87) 3.08 (1.46) 3.46 (1.71)
Overall 3.06 (1.65) 2.93 (1.37) 4.08 (1.80)
MaxOwn
Low trusters 3.08 (1.96) 2.61 (1.16) 4.41 (1.73)
High trusters 2.74 (1.53) 3.37 (1.61) 3.70 (1.65)
Overall 2.93 (1.76) 3.06 (1.47) 4.05 (1.70)
Note. MaxJoint  tendencies toward enhancing joint outcomes;
MinDiff  minimizing (absolute) differences between own and
partner’s outcomes; MaxOther  enhancing the partner’s outcome;
MaxRel  tendencies toward enhancing relative advantage over part-
ner’s outcomes; MaxOwn  enhancing one’s own outcomes.
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Before conducting mediation analyses, we examined the intercor-
relations among the impressions, revealing that benign impressions
exhibited significant, and descriptively strong, correlations with
impressions of all three prosocial goals (rs  .70, .65, and .59; all
ps .001, for MaxJoint, MinDiff, and MaxOther, respectively), as
well as with both proself goals (rs  .50 and .66, both ps 
.001, for MaxOwn and MaxRel, respectively). These findings are
consistent with the theoretical argument that global impressions
are rooted in perceived transformations, or impressions of specific
interaction goals (cf. Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Rusbult & Van
Lange, 2003). Next, we began our analysis by examining the
mediating role of the most global judgment (i.e., benign impres-
sions) followed by examining the mediating role of impressions
regarding a partner’s specific interaction goals.
The analysis of mediation by benign impressions proceeded in
four steps. First, recall that the first contrast (i.e., no communica-
tion vs. communication and no noise), and the interaction of the
first contrast and trust, was significant for both benign impressions
(i.e., the presumed mediator) and cooperation (i.e., the presumed
criterion variable). Second, as would be expected, benign impres-
sions and cooperation were significantly correlated (r  .38, p 
.01). Third, a regression analysis in which cooperation is regressed
onto the first contrast, trust, the interaction, and benign impres-
sions revealed a significant effect for benign impressions ( 
.238, t(94)  2.12, p  .05). Fourth, the inclusion of benign
impressions caused a decline in the variance accounted for by the
first contrast (from   .290, t(94)  3.01, p  .01, to   .188,
t(94) 1.78, ns), a significant reduction (Z 1.98, p .05). Also,
the inclusion of benign impressions caused a decline in the vari-
ance accounted for by the interaction between the first contrast and
trust (from   .261, t(94)  2.70, p  .01, to   .179,
t(94)  1.75, ns), a marginal reduction (Z  1.91, p  .06).
Thus, the findings revealed evidence (albeit preliminary) in sup-
port of the argument that the positive effect of communication, and
its interaction effect with trust, on cooperation would be mediated
by benign impressions.12
As in the previous analysis, the analysis of mediation by im-
pressions of interaction goals proceeded in four steps. First, recall
that the first contrast (i.e., no communication vs. communication
and no noise), and its interaction with trust, was significant for
MaxJoint, MinDiff, and MaxRel transformations (and not signif-
icant for MaxOther and MaxOwn transformations). Second, Max-
Joint, MinDiff, and MaxRel transformations exhibited significant
correlations with level of cooperation (respective rs .52, .48, and
.24; all ps  .05). Next, we performed three separate regression
analyses in which we included each of the transformations (Max-
Joint, MinDiff, and MaxRel) as a predictor variable.
The regression analysis in which cooperation is regressed onto
the first contrast, trust, the interaction, and MaxJoint transforma-
tions revealed a significant effect for MaxJoint transformations
(  .431, t(94)  4.36, p  .001). Moreover, the inclusion of
MaxJoint transformations caused a decline in the variance ac-
counted for by the first contrast (from   .290, t(94)  3.01, p 
.01, to   .126, t(94)  1.32, ns), a significant reduction (Z 
3.01, p  .01). Also, the inclusion of MaxJoint transformations
caused a decline in the variance accounted for by the interaction
between the first contrast and trust (from   .261, t(94) 
2.70, p  .01 to   .150, t(94)  1.63, ns), a significant
reduction (Z  2.17, p  .05).
The regression analysis in which cooperation is regressed onto
the first contrast, trust, the interaction, and MinDiff transforma-
tions revealed a significant effect for MinDiff transformations
(  .371, t(94)  3.71, p  .001). Moreover, the inclusion of
MinDiff transformations caused a decline in the variance ac-
counted for by the first contrast (from   .290, t(94)  3.01, p 
.01, to   .158, t(94)  1.63, ns), a significant reduction (Z 
2.68, p  .01). Also, the inclusion of MinDiff transformations
caused a decline in the variance accounted for by the interaction
between the first contrast and trust (from   .261, t(94) 
2.70, p  .01, to   .170, t(94)  1.81, ns), a significant
reduction (Z  2.17, p  .05).
The regression analysis in which cooperation is regressed onto
the first contrast, trust, the interaction, and MaxRel transforma-
tions revealed no significant effect for MaxRel transformations
( .098, t(94)0.93, ns). Moreover, the inclusion of MaxRel
did not cause a significant decline in the first contrast (from  
.290, t(94)  3.01, p  .01, to   .259, t(94)  2.54, p  .05),
a nonsignificant reduction (Z  0.94, ns), or the interaction be-
tween the first contrast and trust (from .261, t(94)2.70,
p  .01, to   .237, t(94)  2.37, p  .05), a nonsignificant
reduction (Z  0.94, ns). Thus, although judgments of partner’s
MaxJoint and MinDiff transformations—two prosocial transfor-
mations—mediated the effects of the first contrast and its interac-
tion with trust, judgments of partner’s MaxRel transformation did
not qualify as a significant mediator.13
Finally, in a more exploratory vein, we conducted an analysis in
which cooperation was regressed simultaneously onto the first
contrast, trust, and the interaction of the contrast and trust, as well
as on the three impressions that qualified as significant mediators
(i.e., benign impressions, MaxJoint, and MinDiff). This analysis
revealed that only MaxJoint continued to exhibit a significant
association with cooperation (  .371, t(94)  2.44, p  .05).
Benign impressions and MinDiff no longer accounted for signifi-
cant variance in cooperation: For benign impressions   .095,
t(94)  0.70, ns, and for MinDiff   .160, t(94)  1.11, ns.
These findings suggest that impressions about the degree to which
a partner is judged as oriented toward enhancing joint outcomes
(MaxJoint) is a relatively powerful mediator of both the detrimen-
tal effects of noise and the positive effects of communication.
To summarize, the findings revealed evidence (albeit prelimi-
nary) in support of the argument that positive effect of communi-
cation on cooperation, observed for individuals low in trust, is
mediated by a global impression (i.e., benign impressions) and
impressions of two specific interaction goals (i.e., MaxJoint and
MinDiff transformations). Considering all three mediators, the
impressions of the partner’s goal toward enhancing joint outcome
(MaxJoint) appears to be the most powerful mediator of both the
12 An analysis of variance with benign impressions as a covariate
yielded the same findings as the regression analysis.
13 Again, three separate analyses of variance with MaxJoint, MinDiff,
and MaxRel as covariates yielded the same findings as the regression
analysis.
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detrimental effects of noise and the positive effects of
communication.
General Discussion
Two experimental studies provided good support for the present
hypotheses. First, in support of the hypothesis predicting detrimen-
tal effects of noise, both studies revealed that levels of cooperation
and benign impressions were lower when noise was present than
when noise was absent (i.e., supporting Hypotheses 1a and 1b).
Second, and more important, in support of the hypothesis that
communication reduces such detrimental effects, both studies re-
vealed that levels of cooperation and benign impressions were
lower in the no-communication condition than in the communica-
tion condition and no-noise condition (i.e., supporting Hypotheses
2a and 2b). Third, Study 2 revealed that differences between low-
and high-trust individuals were, as predicted, more pronounced in
the condition in which noise challenged impressions of benign
intent (i.e., no-communication condition) than in the condition in
which noise was absent and in the condition in which noise was
effectively reduced through communication (Hypotheses 3a and
3b). Finally, Studies 1 and 2 provided preliminary evidence in
support of the mediating role of impressions of benign intent in
accounting for the positive effects of communication; Study 2
revealed even support for mediation by concrete beliefs regarding
the partner’s goal to enhance joint outcomes and equality in
outcomes. In the following, we discuss these findings in terms of
the present framework, consider some implications of the findings,
and outline some strengths and limitations of the present research,
along with directions for future research.
Detrimental Effects of Noise
The present research revealed that participants’ level of coop-
eration with a partner is significantly diminished when the part-
ner’s choices are every now and then negatively affected by noise.
The instructions in these studies stated that “the computer may
change intended choices” so as to make participants aware of the
possible occurrence of noise in each interaction trial. It is inter-
esting that, despite such instructions, incidents of negative noise
exerted reliable detrimental effects on both impressions of benign
intent and cooperation.
Study 2 complemented the findings of Study 1 by indicating that
the detrimental effects of noise on partner impressions work in two
directions. First, noise hampers the behavioral expression of proso-
cial interaction goals. That is, participants ascribed less concern
with equality in outcomes (MinDiff), joint outcomes (MaxJoint),
and other’s outcomes (MaxOther) to the partner under noise than
under no noise. Second, noise promotes the behavioral expression
of proself interaction goals. That is, participants ascribed greater
concern with own outcomes (MaxOwn) and relative advantage
(MaxRel) to the partner under noise than under no noise. (The
impressions of two prosocial transformations, MaxJoint and
MinDiff, were found to mediate the detrimental effects of
noise—an issue to which we return later).
Hence, even though participants were told beforehand that the
partner’s choices would be affected by noise, they still seemed to
have problems in ascribing diminished cooperation to incidents of
noise and, instead, seemed to hold the personality and interaction
goals of the partner responsible for this diminished cooperation.
This mechanism parallels attributional tendencies toward explain-
ing behavior in terms of intentions and traits rather than external
causes (Jones & Davis, 1965; Ross, 1977), especially negative
behavior (cf. Coovert & Reeder, 1990; Reeder & Brewer, 1979). In
interdependent situations, especially social dilemmas (Allison &
Kerr, 1994), such attributional tendencies are problematic, because
they cause people to lower their levels of cooperation with their
partners. These low levels of cooperation in turn trigger subse-
quent diminished cooperation of the partners. In other words,
incidents of negative noise may bring about relatively enduring
echo effects, a process that has been assumed to underlie escalation
of conflict and international tension (e.g., Axelrod, 1984).
Benefits of Communication
The present results also revealed that the detrimental effects of
noise can be relatively easily overcome by communication. Part-
ners who communicated in the form of sending messages after
some incidents of noise (in which noise and original intentions
were explained and apologies were made occasionally) were able
to elicit levels of cooperation and impressions of benign intent that
were as high as in the condition in which noise was absent. These
positive effects of communication are consistent with our reason-
ing outlined earlier: By communicating about noise partners are
able to psychologically undo noise, thereby maintaining impres-
sions of benign intent, which are essential to cooperative behavior.
When partners communicate, individuals appear willing to give
a partner another chance: They react to the messages of intent and
keep behaving cooperatively, rather than reacting to diminished
outcomes for self due to noise. There is increasing evidence that
generosity and forgiveness are effective at coping with noise in
social dilemmas, as suggested by computer simulations (e.g., Ben-
dor et al., 1991; Kollock, 1993; Molander, 1985; Nowak & Sig-
mund, 1992), as well as by a follow-up study using real partici-
pants (Van Lange et al., 2002). The present findings complement
this growing literature by showing that people are actually willing
to forgive an incident of noise, as long as the partner communicates
about noise and clarifies the actual (benign) intentions. Thus, the
positive effects of communication may be interpreted in terms of
maintenance of impressions of benign intent through providing
clarity on intentions (e.g., psychologically undoing noise), which
in turn seems to enhance tendencies toward forgiveness, which are
crucial to effectively coping with noise.
Consistent with this line of reasoning, the present research
provided good support (albeit preliminary) for the mediating role
of benign impressions in accounting for the positive effects of
communication. Similar effects were observed for judgments
about the partner’s goal of enhancing joint outcomes and equality
in outcomes, suggesting that in the context of social dilemmas with
noise “benign intent” may be a general label for the concrete
pursuit of “joint outcomes” and “equality in outcomes.” Such
prosocial impressions or beliefs seem essential to giving the other
“the benefit of the doubt” (Bendor et al., 1991; Kramer, 1999; Van
Lange et al., 2002), thereby enhancing forgiveness of negative
behavior as well as cooperative interaction. Indeed, findings re-
vealed significant mediation for both benign impressions and two
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specific “prosocial” impressions (MaxJoint and MinDiff transfor-
mations). Moreover, regressions analyses involving all three sig-
nificant mediators revealed that impressions of MaxJoint contrib-
uted above and beyond the other two mediators in accounting for
the detrimental effects of noise and the positive effects of com-
munication. Generally, these findings are of great theoretical in-
terest, in that they provide support for the notion that individuals
in social dilemmas are inclined to form both global impressions
and specific impressions in terms of outcome transformations,
which appear to be important for understanding key psychological
mechanisms underlying cooperation (cf. Kelley et al., 2003; Kelley
& Thibaut, 1978). As such, the present research contributes to
understanding why noise exerts detrimental effects on cooperation
and why communication provides an effective means for reducing
or overcoming the detrimental effects of noise on cooperation in
social dilemmas.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the impressions of
MaxJoint and MinDiff tend to go together in the actor’s mind just
as these two (conceptually independent) goals tend to go together
in the actual orientations of people. That is, individuals who are
more strongly oriented toward enhancing joint outcomes are also
more strongly oriented toward enhancing equality in outcomes—
and both orientations are needed to explain why people do or do
not exhibit cooperation in iterated social dilemmas (Kelley &
Stahelski, 1970; Van Lange, 1999). Thus, the two prosocial im-
pressions that are found to serve as a mediator are exactly the same
as the actual orientations that only in combination account for
cooperative behavior.
Beyond the contributions discussed earlier, the present findings
are interesting from at least two additional perspectives. First, in
his influential work Axelrod (1984) attributed the success of TFT
to niceness, forgiveness, and retaliation, as well as to clarity—the
fact that partners are able to understand a partner’s primary inter-
action goals. Past research provides some support for the benefits
of clarity, through verbal communication (e.g., Chen, 1996; Chen
& Komorita, 1994; Orbell et al., 1988) or through behavior (Ko-
morita, Hilty, & Parks, 1991; Komorita, Parks, & Hulbert, 1992;
Parks & Komorita, 1997). However, we do not know of any
published study that has examined clarity as means for coping with
noise. Conversely, in computer simulations with noise much at-
tention has been paid to improving TFT by changing some of its
other beneficial properties—examples are comparisons among
versions of TFT differing in niceness, forgiveness, and retaliation.
Yet, one may argue that negative noise also challenges impressions
of benign intention because of a lack of clarity. Hence, one might
suggest two distinct ways of coping with noise, one by which
individuals seek to maintain or improve clarity (e.g., by commu-
nicating about noise) and another by which individuals seek to
convey prosocial intentions (e.g., by exhibiting generosity, for-
giveness, and niceness).
Second, earlier work on communication in social dilemmas has
typically (but not always) revealed that communication about the
choices at hand enhances cooperation. Such encouraging findings
have been explained in terms of enhancing trust, publicly display-
ing commitment (also through pledging), collective identity, or
mechanisms by which one conveys promise or threat (e.g., Chen &
Komorita, 1994; Dawes et al., 1977; Deutsch, 1958; Loomis, 1959;
Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994; Lindskold, Han, & Betz, 1986;
Orbell et al., 1988). The present research contributes to this work
by indicating that one important function of communication may
flow from providing clarity regarding a past interaction—by com-
municating discrepancies between intended and actual outcomes
for the partner (e.g., “I did not mean it this way”). Hence, a
promising avenue for future research is to study communication
when impressions of benign intent are most seriously challenged
(e.g., in social dilemmas with noise).
Influence of Trust
Although we obtained good support for the primary hypotheses
underlying this research, it is also true that these hypotheses were
supported for low trusters but not for high trusters. More generally,
the present findings provided evidence in support of the hypothesis
that individual differences in trust should have more pronounced
effects under conditions of noise than under conditions of no noise
or conditions in which noise is communicated. We consider these
findings important for at least three broad reasons.
To begin with, high trusters tend to harbor impressions of
benign intent and high levels of cooperation even under conditions
of noise without communication—indeed, the mean levels of co-
operation and impressions were not higher under conditions in
which there was no noise or noise was unlikely to matter a lot
(communication condition). This finding suggests that high trust-
ers may be less susceptible to exhibiting negativity effects or to
inferring negative intentions and traits from diminished interaction
outcomes. In other words, high trusters may be inclined to give
others the benefit of doubt, emphasizing the role of external
circumstances and forces in accounting for negative behavior (cf.
Kramer, 1999). In contrast, low trusters are more likely to rely on
a predominant heuristic that people cannot be fully trusted, a
schema which readily allows them to interpret seemingly negative
behavior (i.e., diminished cooperation) in terms of tendencies
toward competition. Consistent with this reasoning, low trusters
suspected their partners of having greater concern with advantage
or competition (MaxRel) and lower concern with joint outcomes or
equality in outcomes (MaxJoint and MinDiff). Future research
may benefit from examining differential negativity effects for
individuals with differing levels of trust.
Second, it is interesting to relate the present findings to the
extant literature on dispositional trust, which reveals—somewhat
surprisingly—that dispositional trust does not tend to influence
cooperative behavior in two-person social dilemmas (e.g., Yama-
gishi, 2001; Yamagishi & Kakiuchi, 2000). In retrospect, this can
be understood because these social dilemmas were not affected by
noise, hence allowing for considerable clarity in the link between
intention and behavior. In contrast, in “noisy” social dilemmas,
impressions of benign intent are strongly challenged, and such
uncertainty or ambiguity brings along a larger impact of person-
ality differences that are linked to global beliefs regarding malig-
nant or benign intentions of other people. In terms of Snyder and
Ickes (1985), noisy social dilemmas may be conceptualized as
“weak situations” in which personality differences are more likely
to matter than in “strong situations,” which provide strong guide-
lines for how to interpret the situation and the partner as well as for
how to behave oneself. Hence, social dilemmas with noise (and
related forms of ambiguity or uncertainty) may well be the types of
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situation that are especially likely to activate differences in per-
sonality that are linked to trust.
Finally, the present results show that especially low trusters are
at risk in developing noncooperative interactions, even with part-
ners who may in fact pursue cooperative goals. This finding is
consistent with some earlier studies revealing that high trusters
react more strongly to messages expressing a cooperative intent,
whereas low trusters react more strongly to messages expressing a
competitive intent (Parks et al., 1996). According to Rotter (1980),
high trusters will trust a person unless they have clear evidence
that he or she cannot be trusted, whereas low trusters distrust a
person unless there is clear evidence that he or she can be trusted.
These differences in perspective between high and low trusters
may eventually result in differences in behavior they elicit from
their partners. Indeed, the present findings lend support to the
notion that low trusters may in fact “create a social world” in
which they are continuously confronted with self-centered behav-
ior, which provides not only inferior outcomes but also confirma-
tion that others cannot be trusted to cooperate (cf. Kelley &
Stahelski, 1970).
Avenues for Future Research
We begin by noting that noise in social dilemmas represents a
new topic that we regard as promising for generating novel ave-
nues for future research. Most important, noise can be thought of
as a situational feature that may activate various psychological
processes (e.g., feelings of uncertainty, trust) and interactional
processes (e.g., communication, misunderstanding). Such pro-
cesses are relevant to various key constructs in, for example,
evolutionary theory (e.g., cheater detection; Cosmides & Tooby,
1992), theories of trust (e.g., Kramer, 1999; Yamagishi, 2001),
interdependence theory (e.g., transformations; Kelley & Thibaut,
1978), and communication theory (e.g., effective communication;
Gottman, 1994). We suggest that new avenues of research can be
located in these broad domains, addressing specific questions
relevant to social interaction and relationships (e.g., is marital
quality and stability predicted by communicating about noise? cf.
Gottman, 1994) and group processes (e.g., are members catego-
rized as out-group given less benefit of the doubt than members
categorized as in-group members? cf. Marques, Abrams, & Seroˆ-
dio, 2001).
We consider it appropriate to briefly discuss some limitations of
the present research and concrete avenues for future research.
First, although it is common to use TFT as the default strategy
followed by an interaction partner in a social dilemma, this “con-
vention” has the limitation that findings may not be directly
generalized to environments that consist of strategies that are
somewhat less reciprocal than TFT. Although Study 1 revealed no
differences between at least two strategies (i.e., TFT and TFT 
1), we suggest that it would be useful to examine the benefits of
communication in social environments involving a greater variety
in strategies, including ones that every now and then deviate from
strict reciprocity.
Second, although the present research did examine—and did
provide evidence in support of—the mediating role of impressions
of benign intent and judgments regarding the partner’s transfor-
mations (MaxJoint and MinDiff), complementary mechanisms un-
derlying the benefits of communication in this paradigm remain to
be illuminated. For example, in addition to providing clarity as
such, communication by a partner may to some degree serve as a
reminder of noise, may decrease feelings of anonymity (e.g., the
partner may be less of a “stranger” through communication), and
the occasional apology, while common, may also have promoted
impressions of benign intent and cooperation.
Last but not least, we can imagine that several readers consider
the positive effects of communication as “to be expected” or at
least “far from counterintuitive.” However, we do not regard these
positive effects as self-evident. In fact, from the perspective of
rational self-interest—a prevalent assumption in theories about
social interaction—one may argue that communication may also
be used to misinform the partner about one’s intentions, especially
when the intentions are oriented toward pursuing own outcomes or
relative advantage. In that sense, it may even be considered re-
markable that individuals do not tend to distrust communication
about noise—especially because the positive effects of communi-
cation were observed for individuals low in trust (Study 2). At the
same time, it is possible that the experimental circumstances were
quite trusting and congenial so that deliberate forms of misinfor-
mation were not anticipated. However, experimental games are not
known to promote trusting or congenial circumstances; if anything,
the opposite is more strongly believed (e.g., because the other is a
stranger, the focus is on “outcomes,” see Van Lange, 2000).
Nevertheless, we can imagine that less-trusting circumstances
(e.g., an incident of noise in the very first interaction, increasing
the frequency of noise, presenting the other as an out-group mem-
ber) may cause an individual to question or challenge the honesty
of an interaction partner’s messages. Such circumstances may
perhaps show that communication yields positive effects that are
less strong, no positive effects at all, or perhaps even negative
effects. Thus, we suggest that several issues need to be explored in
future research to understand the effectiveness, as well as the
potential boundary conditions, of communication as a means of
coping with noise in social dilemmas.
Concluding Remarks
It is important to acknowledge that noise in social interaction
represents a truly social psychological topic in that it addresses
impression formation, attributional activity, and behavior and so-
cial interaction. As such, it is ironic that the discussion and
research about noise in social interaction tends to take place in
disciplines other than social psychology, in particular theoretical
biology, political science, economics, and sociology. Moreover,
virtually all research focusing on noise in social interaction has
relied on computer simulations as the dominant paradigm. Given
that coping with noise is truly social psychological, it is important
to consider intrinsic social psychological mechanisms for coping
with noise. We hope that the study of communication, with a
conceptual and empirical focus on impressions of benign intent
and trust, serves as an important step toward understanding how
real people actually cope as well as how they might have coped
with noise in social dilemmas.
We close by illustrating the potentially far-reaching implications
of research on noise and trust in social dilemmas. Returning to the
anecdotes described earlier, incidents of negative noise are easily
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interpreted in terms of malignant intent, especially during periods
of international tension and distrust (e.g., during the Cold War).
Such misunderstandings may have very unfortunate consequences,
including international warfare, violence, and suffering. As such,
the present findings provide suggestive evidence for the function-
ality of a direct phone connection between world leaders during
such circumstances of tension. Indeed, a hot line allows for direct
communication about noise and for clarifying of intentions,
thereby enhancing possibilities for preventing long-lasting echo
effects involving mutual loss, suffering, and pain.
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